D. Feeny, ‘The decline of property rights in man in Thailand, 1800-1913’, Journal of Economic History, 49 (1989), 285-96.

Abstract [page 285] Like many land-abundant, labor-scarce economies, Thailand had a well-developed system of property rights in man. Over the nineteenth century corvée slavery were abolished and replaced by military conscription, head tax , and more precise property rights in land. Concomitant trends include extensive commercialization, the growth of international trade, imperialist threats to Thai sovereignty, and the growth of a centralized unitary state.


Looking at preindustrial Europe and the Americas provides a number of generalisation about the evolution of property rights in man. [286] Slavery and serfdom are associated with places where land is abundant and labour is scarce. Whether property rights in man takes the form of slavery of serfdom depends on the economy. Slavery is favored where property right are well defined and economic activity is cheaply supervised. Serfdom is favoured where property rights are weak and there is an information asymmetry which favour supervision by he lord.

The model used in this paper involves treating the behaviour of agents in changing institutional frameworks as endogenous. It exploits the metaphors of supply and demand. Demand for change arises when current intuitions leave some benefits uncaptured – i.e the relative real rise in a production factor will lead to a rise in the demand for property rights in that factor to be better defined. [287] The supply of institutional change relies on the flexibility of the political order. The expected net benefit to elite decision makes matters a great deal in defining supply.


Early 19th C Thailand was largely a subsistence rice economy but intra-Asian trade was significant. The volume of trade increased though the early 19th C but a major increase occurred in 1855 with the Bowring Treaty with Great Britain and similar treaties with other Western Powers and Japan which established free trade and the exemption of foreign powers from domestic law. The reduction in tariffs reduced central revenue [288] and gave the state an incentive to overhaul its system of public administration. An incentive to bring the Western Powers under domestic control created the impetus for a modern legal system.

Rice exports grew 4.43% by volume and 5.64% by value from 1864 to 1910. The cost of imports did not increase as much and the terms of trade moved in favour of rice. In the same period real wages measured in rice declined by 1.35% per year from 1850 to 1914 (0.7% from 1864 to 1914). This created weaker incentives for well defined property rights in man and stronger incentives for well defined property rights in land.


The paper outlines what property rights in man were like in early 180s Thailand. Thai Society was divided into five categories: the Monarch, members of the royal family, the nobility, commoners and slaves.

[289] Nobles had direct control of the commoners, known as phrai. Phrai were split into three groups who owed different amounts of corvée.

  1. phrai luang who owed 6 months of labour a year to the monarch or 18-24 baht
  2. phrai som who owed 2 months a year to their noble an 1 month per year to the monarch or 6 baht
  3. phrai suai who were obligated to work for 8 days for the monarch or pay 1.5 baht.

There were seven categories of slave, but under two broad headings, war slaves and debt slaves. As there were no well defined property rights in land, people often acted as collateral on loans.

In contrast to property rights in man, property rights in land well less well defined. In theory all land belonged to the king, but in practice land could be used privately so long as no damage was done to it (a usufruct property regime), or not left unattended for a long period of time.

[290] V

The evolution of property rights in Thailand occurred in the context of commercialisation, a struggle for control of manpower between king and nobles, and the centralisation of power in Bangkok. Migration to Bangkok increased the number of wage labourers, commercialisation made payment in money easier and the king could rely on wage labourers rather than serfs for labour. By accepting monetary payment for corvée obligations the king could undercut the nobles and increase his relative power. Competition between noble and monarch reduced the corvée obligations to stop peasants fleeing their onerous workloads. [292]To modernise the state under Chulalongkorn (1868-1910) a head tax replaced the corvée obligation’s nonmilatary role and a conscripted army allowed the king to maintain an army as required.

Parallel to the dismantling of corvée is the abolition of slavery. To undercut the nobility’s power further it was in the king’s interest to reduce the practice of slavery – nobles used slaves extensively as they were both collateral and the spoils of war. [294] In 1868 an edict was issued which meant that the wife’s consent was required to sell her or her children. A gradual reduction in the price of slaves was decreed in 1874, so that all slave children would be freed by 21 – in 1890 this was extended to all slaves and in 1905 slavery was abolished. The price of slaves was to be reduced by 4 baht per month until freedom occurred. [295] This gradual method stopped and large fiscal strain on the state from occurring and reduced opposition from slave owners.

Although humanitarian interests had a role, Thailand had to regain sovereignty and set up a legal system under which foreign powers wold agree to be ruled. The economics were also conducive, the increase in the value of land and rice was well known and this shifted people’s incentives away from slave ownership and towards land ownership for both production and collateral. Evidence suggests that the abolition of slavery allowed labour to move more freely.

[296] Conclusions

Domestic and international political motives, rather than pure economic incentives appears to have played a large role in dismantling human property right regimes. Neither corvée or slavery were abolished because they were unprofitable or because an elite had stopped enjoying their benefits – however economic trends made them relatively less attractive. Rice farming methods of Thailand in the period relied on farmer proprietors and was unsuited to slavery. Economics played a role, but ideological and normative factors played major roles.

Austin, Gareth. ‘Reciprocal Comparison and African History: Tackling Conceptual Eurocentrism in the Study of Africa’s Economic Past’, African Studies Review, 50 (2007), pp 1-28.

[1] Abstract: This article argues for constructive responses to the dominance, in the analysis of African economic history, of concepts derived from Western experience. It reviews the existing responses of this kind, highlighting the fact that some of the most influential ideas applied to African economies, past and present, have been coined in the context not of Europe or North America but rather of other relatively poor regions formerly under European colonial rule. These “Third World” contributions have been enriching for African studies, though they have been duly criticized in African contexts, in accordance with the usual scholarly pattern. It is argued here that the main requirement for overcoming conceptual Eurocentrism in African history, in the interests of a more genuinely “general” social science and “global” history, is reciprocal comparison of Africa and other continents—or, more precisely, of specific areas within Africa with counterparts elsewhere. Pioneering examples of such comparisons are reviewed and, to illustrate the possibilities, a set of propositions is put forward from African history that may be useful for specialists on other parts of the world. The article concludes with suggestions for ways in which Africanists can best pursue the project of reciprocal comparison, and with a plea for us to be more intellectually ambitious.

This article is about Africanists can best respond to the continued Eurocentrism of the study of Africa. [2] A lot of the tools used by Africanists come from Europe (but this flow has not been reversed). The “stylised facts” of western history, agriculture, statecraft, capitalism etc. has influenced the questions which Africanists have asked. [3] This article looks at Eurocentrism in the recent literature of African economic historiography, Africanists views of Africa have been shaped also by other regions of the “Third World”, part three argues that Eurocentric generalisations should not be abandoned but instead bettered and improved by Africanists, part four looks at the recipricol comparisons from various scholars.

Conceptual Eurocentrism in African Economic Historiography: The Last Quarter Century

Most economic history of Africa has been undertaken using frameworks imported from “the West.” Some were influenced by the categories associated with Karl Marx or Max Weber, Adam Smith or Karl Polanyi. Ultimately their “abstractions were usually underpinned, explicitly or implicitly, by narratives of European history.” [4] Most common now is a “rational-choice” framework which looks at transaction costs, contract theory and the actions of individuals and societies seeking a set of institutions which may-but may not- provide solutions.

We have to consider to what extent rational-choice political economy is Eurocentric in its intellectual inspirations. First, there is considerable difference between the paper or book on Africa and the overarching historical model. Second, the broad sense of property in rational-choice political economy-as entitlements to use resources in permitted ways-fits well in African history.

Rational-choice political economy was developed in the mid-20th C in the USA and Britain and reflect its time and location. Coase and Williamson had to describe the world around them. [5] In a mcro-form rational-choice political economy sees a certain way of setting up institutions as right, but is not teleological,in that it can see that failures have occurred rather frequently throughout history. It has been inspired by western history but can be used in ways which are not Eurocentric.

Models from the Third World in African Economic History

Most African history has been written from a Western perspective, but there has also been much work using the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, and recently South Asia as reference points.

[6] W. A. Lewis’s famous model of “economic development with unlimited supplies of labour” (Lewis 1954) would have been inspired not only by Western history, but by travels around the poorer parts of the world.  This dual economic surplus-labour/capitalist-production framework has been applied fruitfully to South Rhodesia and South Africa (however, low wages in the surplus labour zones were often in fact caused by state repression).

Sen’s theory of entitlement and work on famines is relevant to Africa; famines rarely occur because food production shinks, but instead because people cannot get access to it. Other Indian Economists have also played a large role in shaping Africanists views of Africa. [7] Models drawn from Latin America and Asia have played a large role.  Ideas such as “rent-seeking” and “urban bias” have large roles to play in understanding Africa.

There is as much South-South academic criticism as there is North-South academic criticism. [8] Lewis is criticised (see above), Sen is taken to task for under politicising his account of famine, he also neglects the very real difficulties of agricultural production.

Toward Better Generalizations: The Method of “Reciprocal Comparison” and African History

Does it matter if the concepts of African history have an exotic Western provenance? [9] Early economic work on Africa illustrated that markets had existed long ago in Africa, and that homo economus had existed in Africa too; this helped Africa, but by living up to a Westerner’s model, Adam Smith.  That something developed outside Africa does not mean that it cannot be helpful to Africanists. Two example are given on page 9 on Niger Delta canoehouses and Kikuyu society.

In other cases Western models are not so useful. [10] Many European metanarratives are not useful, Africanists need to alter them to make them relevant – you cannot retreat away from comparative analysis on grounds of historiographical exceptionalism or postmodernist epistemology.

Pomeranz’s work on reciprocal comparison is useful, we can treat China, Europe and Africa all as deviations from the norm of the other and ask “why?” What is also useful is a disaggregation of the units of analysis. Why was the Niger Delta not the Yangzi Delta or the Netherlands etc?

This is made difficult by a couple of things. First of all:

[F[amiliarity with at least the basics of European history tends to be expected from specialists on non-Western countries, whereas the converse is not the case.

There are also multiple narratives on most topics and in most regions of Africa, let alone sub-Saharan Africa. These need to be unpacked and explored before reciprocal comparisons can begin to make sense. [11] There have been many books on Africa attempting to pick out rends and potential “building blocks” for Africa as a whole and its macro regions.

An important part of reciprocal comparison is to derive models from Africa and then to apply them to other parts of the world. For example, Goody argues that because the plough was used less south of the Sahara agricultural surpluses (and hence complementary activty) was lower in that region. Goody traces patterns in state formation and inheritence from this. However, even in this Austin argues that too much weight may be being placed on agricultural surplus over other sources of wealth.

[12-13] Lots of important scholarship has come out of Africa. Collier studied the franc zone and gave valuable insights into disperate countries using the same currency. Fenoaltea’s study of the slave trade from an African perspective allowed him to offer an alanysis of slavery in a European context, from the Roman’s onward. Thomas studied witchcraft in both Africa and England. Penninggroth uses emancipation in Fantes on the Gold coast to spread light on the experience of blanks in the US South.

Some Lessons from African Experience for the Comparative Study of Long-Term Economic Development

[14] Study of Africa can help us look at the world in different ways. For example, “in sub-Saharan Africa, before and in many cases during and after the colonial period, there was no strong or necessary correlation between agricultural intensification (increase in the quantity of labor and/ or capital applied per unit of land) and overall productivity (i.e., “total factor productivity,” the ratio of output to the totality of inputs). Thus intensive agriculture was not necessarily more advanced” This labour intensive agriculture is different to the capital intensive agriculture observed in late modern Europe.  Labour and capital were limited in Africa but abundant land was available, this has consequences for analyses which pit an “industrious” asian revolution against and “industrial” European revolutions.

[16] Studies in Africa can also lead us to alter our view that rent-seeking and economic growth are opposed. Slavery represents the extraction of an economic rent, but it would be anachronistic to say that this did not contribute to the development of Europe and America. Africa has also taught us that rent-seeking is self perpetuating (there are increasing returns to scale) and likely to be stable. However, under certain circumstances, rent seeking can be unstable, as in the 1980s.

[17] A study of Africa also leads us to question the primacy which states are given in analyses such as North’s. Much of Africa has often been stateless, yet not economically undynamic. However, looking at the privately and state enforced slave trade, certain advantagous of statehood come to the fore in terms of trade and economic efficiency.

[18] Reflections

There have been few reciprocal comparisons involving Africa, but those that have been done are of a high quality. African studies has much to offer the world, for example the “informal sector” is a widely used term and framework, and originated in Africa.

Conceptual Eurocentrism continues to operate at a range of levels of abstraction. Ultimately, reciprocal comparison needs to supersede it on all those levels.

Kenny, Charles (2005) “Why Are We Worried About Income? Nearly Everything that Matters is Converging” in World Development Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 1–19

[1] Summary. — Convergence of national GDP/capita numbers is a common, but narrow, measure of global success or failure in development. This paper takes a broader range of quality of life variables covering health, education, rights and infrastructure and examines if they are converging across countries. It finds that these measures are converging as a rule and (where we have data) that they have been converging for some time. The paper turns to a discussion of what might be driving convergence in quality of life even as incomes diverge, and what this might mean for the donor community.

Everyone is interested in economic convergence; it would represent the catching up of the poor world with its rich contemporary. Basically, everywhere started poor, but now some places are wealthy. Income has been the sole, or at least overriding criteria, for some time and this stems from a humanitarian impulse to see improvements in the global standard of living. Kenny quotes Lucas:

[I]s there some action a government could take that would lead the Indian economy to grow like Indonesia s or Egypts? If so, what exactly? If not, what is it about the ‘‘nature of India’’ that makes it so? The consequences for human welfare involved in questions like this are simply staggering: once one starts to think about them, it is hard to think about anything else (Lucas, 1988).

[2] This interest in income comes from the linking of income to most if not all quality of life measures. Even if income isn’t your main focus in a humanitarian sense, an increasing income in a poor country will probably help you achieve your aim. As income has diverged many have inferred that quality of life was diverged as well. However, while income has diverged, quality of life measures are converging almost across the board.

The link between the quality of life an income

GDP per capita is an incomplete measure of wellbeing, this is one of the reasons HDI was introduced by the UN. In fact, from infant mortality to life expectancy to war deaths per capita, there is very little correlation between income, income growth and other quality of life indicators. If you have been seeking to increase someone’s life, then increasing their income may not be the easiest way to do so.

Evidence for the convergence in measures of the quality of life

This paper builds on the work of Crafts, Ram and Ingram.

HDI of poor and rich countries are converging, despite relative inequality and massive poverty remaining common. [2-3] Calorific intake, primary enrolment and urbanisation are all converging.

Methods of measuring convergence and methodological issues

 There is a discussion of different measures of convergence and divergence here which kinda goes over my head. I will revisit if necessary.

Data quality is an issue, with income and all other quality of life data.

[4] Weighting is also problematic, should China count the same as Sierra Leone, or should measures be weighted to reflect China’s massive population? Using individual data rather than national per capita data can massively change our analysis.

Which quality of life measures to use is also a  question which is important. There seems little scientific way to select which measure to use and how much importance to give it. However, effort has been made to use measures for which there is good coverage in area and time.


The results presented in Appendix Tables 11–13 suggest almost every potential quality of life variable shows significant variation across countries. In turn, this suggests that, either throughout history some quality of life indicators have been higher in some parts of the world than others, or that, in some point in the past, there must have been divergence. The available evidence suggests elements of both stories, although with a predominance of the second. The evidence also suggests that more recently (for most of the 20th century) the story is reversed—it is one of convergence [my emphasis].

Maddison shows that the long term and continuing pattern in income is one of divergence. In 1000 AD Western Europe and Africa had roughly equal GDP per capita ($400), but by 1998 Africa had reached the income Europe had in the early 19th C whereas Europe’s income was now 13 times that. Since 1950 inequality has not so much continued to diverge as stagnate.

[5] However, apart income GDP, and depending on which measure of convergence you use, all or nearly all other measures have converged since the industrial revolution worldwide.


There is a historical minimum life expectancy of around 24 (younger than this and presumably societies just collapse). Divergence occurred from the early modern period until the end of the 19th C and then convergence in life expectancy began.  This convergence in life expectancy has been driven by a convergence in infant mortality. Calorific intake improved in many places and this has in part driven the convergence, although this factor is unlikely to have been enough to enough to explain all the convergence.


Divergence in literacy levels can be traced back before the 18th C. By 1913 literacy in India was 13% and in the UK around 96%. Global literacy in the rich world has reached ~100% and the poor world’s literacy has improved too, closing the gap. Between 1950-99 global literacy rose from 52% to 81%, driven largely by improvements in the poor world.

A driving factor in this is the increased availability of primary education. Tertiary education has also become more common in the developing world.

Social Indicators

Female literacy as a percentage of male literacy (an important measure of economic potential and gender equality), has converged since the 1970s from 59% to 80%. The percentage of children not in the global labour force has also decreased from 76% to 90%.

War deaths per capita is the least encouraging measure. The world remained a war like place in the developing world throughout the end of the 20th C.

Other, more lighthearted but important, measures have also converged. Beer production per capita has nearly doubled since 1950, representing an increase in “non-necessary” production.

What is going on?

Why have we seen convergence in quality of life measures accompany divergence in income?

There  could be large returns to small increases in income for the very poorest people. A little extra food can hugely improve the immune system for example.

How do we explain the performance of Africa over the last 50 years? GDP per capita has increased from $477 to just $561 over the 40 years (1960–99), falling from 4.8% to 1.9% of the average for a high-income country. Compare this to an under-five survival rate which has risen from 746 to 839 per 1,000 live births over the same period—or 77% of the high income survival rate to 84% of that rate. In terms of infant survival (86–91%), life expectancy (57–60%, despite the impact of the AIDS crisis reducing life expectancy by three years 1992– 99) and gross primary enrollment (35–70%), the trend is also one of convergence (all figures from World Bank, 2000). While Africa remains far behind, it is catching up on these measures, which is more than can be said for its performance on income.

Ingram argues that income tends to have a declining marginal impact on quality of life. Small increases in income reap massive rewards.

However, there appears to be more going on (even if the above argument appears very important). Mozambique saw it’s per capita income decline over the period 1950-99 but its life expectancy, literacy and primary enrollment all increased.

Looking at the data they show us that it takes one tenth of the income that it did in 1870 to live the same amount of time. Life expectancy for countries with a GDP per capita today of $300 have the same life expectancy as countries of 1870 with a GDP per capita income of $3000. Life expectancy has also become far more egalitarian than it was in 1870.

Better immunisation plays a role. Increase in primary enrollment and literacy have helped the efficacy of other public health campaigns, who can now use posters, where they before had to rely on word of mouth. 

To back up this “public health policy not just income helps improve quality of life” argument it has been observed that urban mortality is lower than rural mortality – something only achieved in Europe and the US after extensive public health campaigns.


Different income measures yield different degrees of divergence. For example, the proportion of people living in extreme poverty (less than $1 a day) has decreased tremendously; a massive convergence with the rich world. However, income has diverged in more general terms.

While aid, the Washington Consensus or globalisation have had mixed outcomes with respect to income, by other measures they should surely deserve some degree of credit for the almost across the board improvement in quality of life measures.

The debate today rests on the assumption that there has been a failure in the developing world, because there has been so little improvement in income, perhaps this pessimism is misplaced.

Protected: EH483 Notes for Students (Rather a lot of LSE information here so I’m password protecting this one)

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Protected: EH481: Reading and Tasks List 2010 (Rather a lot of LSE information here so I’m password protecting this one)

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Global History for Global Citizenship by Patrick Karl O’Brien: A Summary

Why is it important to study Global History?

Nietzsche said that ” knowledge of the past has always been desired in the services of the present.” That is still true, because Globalisation is the leitmotiv of our time Global History’s diffusion into systems of preparatory and higher education is unavoidable. Secondly, as science heads towards the ever smaller scale, Higgs boson and quarks, so other subjects have scaled in the opposite direction. Lastly, despite the large time scales, huge areas involved and heterogeneity of cultures involved, Global History is possible. So, we can do it, there is space for it and it is needed to understand the present.

It is important to historicise globalisation. Were it not for globalisation, of knowledge, of techniques and cultures, Global history would not be possible. However, without global history we can be left with multiple overlapping and contradictory descriptions of globalisation.

Historians have already shown that a global world existed for some before the 19th C transport and industrial revolution. Globalisation as an interrelated geopolitical, political, social, economic, religious and cultural process runs through history like a thread. But it can be divided into four heuristic stages.

Archaic globalisation: The ancient civilisations and their interactions up to the 14th C and the beginning of European exploration and expansion overseas.

Proto-globalisation: 14th C tp 1840s. Columbus, De Gama, Magellan and other’s journeys of discovery and overseas settlement. The expansion of overseas commerce and the relative decline in importance of overland commerce.

Modern globalisation: 1846 to 1948. As Marx said “Bourgeoisie exploiting the world” – a different sort of empire and globalisation which gave the world global systems of production and communication.

Contemporary globalisation: 1948 onwards. The independence of India in 1948 and the foundation of the People’s Republic of China were a profound qualitative change from what occurred under the previous round of globalisation.

These aren’t true categories in any epistemological sense, but they are useful to direct out analysis. We can examine the extend intensity, velocity and outcomes of connections over time through time and explore the forces changing the world.

The Hot and Cold War which occurred from 1939-1989 had a profound effect on the world. There is a greater demand for human rights, peaceful conditions of commerce, environmental protection and diffusion of development beyond the borders of states through some form of global governance.

Today’s globalisation is different to that of the past both quantitatively and qualitatively. To study of Global History is not to be an apologist for any neoliberal or neoconservative ideology, Global History can teach us the malign as well as benign outcomes of Globalisation.

For example, those who have studied the difficulty with which areas develop are not so enthrall to Ricardian principles. They can see, have studied, how forming states and domestic economies is a protracted and complex process. A process easily thrown off course by uncontrolled engagement with powerful geopolitical, economic and cultural forces from beyond porous borders.

Public History

Modern popular history often promotes patriotic (and xenophobic) narratives on economic development. These have drawn wide criticism for their ignorance of Japan, China, India, Africa and other “knowable” others. An over reliance on Marx’s of Adam Smith’s critique of Asiatic modes of production is not useful.

Global History has to engage with these dominant and parochial narratives because if it does not, their proponents will a) write school textbooks and b) promote their ideas through the television and through popular writing.  This publication is often done to promote an ideology – usually unfeted free enterprise or Stalinism.

Modern History, partly due to its genesis, is far too focussed on the local and the national. Global history allows us to approach global politics, society, culture, geopolitics, demography and social change. Global History can do this because it attempts to decentre itself and to be multidisciplinary.

Global History can help a global civil society grow to match a global political and economic realm. No objective understanding of the past is possible but an understanding of social and political processes is needed. This is not a new mission because all historians have always written with a mission, even if an ironic detachment was need to be taken seriously. What is different now is that Globalisation and Global History allow historians to show that we are all Global Citizens.

HY423: Empire, Colonialism and Globalisation – Indicitive Reading


  • M Doyle, Empires, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1986
  • P Kennedy, The rise and fall of the great powers, 1988
  • J Tracy (Ed), The Political Economy of Merchant Empires, Cambridge, 1993
  • G V Scammell, The First Imperial Age, London, 1989
  • J H Parry, Trade and Dominion, London, 1971
  • D Lieven, Empire. The Russian Empire and its Rivals, Pimlico, 2003
  • C A Bayly, Imperial Meridian, London, 1989
  • S Howe, Empire. A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2002
  • G Lundestad, The Fall of Great Powers, Oxford University Press, 1994

EH483: The Development and Integration of the World Economy in the 19th and 20th Centuries – Indicative reading


  • B Arthur (Ed), Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy (1994)
  • M Bordo, A Taylor, J Williamson (2003), Globalization in Historical Perspective
  • J Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel (1997)
  • S Engerman & K Sokoloff, Factor Endowments, Institutions and Differential Paths of Growth among New World Economies (1994)
  • R Findlay, K O’Rourke (2009), Power and Plenty
  • B Foster, The Vulnerable Planet: A Short Economic History of the Environment (1993)
  • J Goody, The East in the West (1996)
  • Wang Gungwu (Ed), Global History and Migrations (1997)
  • I Inkster, Science and Technology in History (1981)
  • E L Jones, Growth Recurring (1988)
  • M Livi-Bacci, A Concise History of World Population (1997)
  • P Mathias & J Davis (Eds), Agriculture and Industrialization from the 18th Century to the Present Day (1996)
  • M Obstfeld, A Taylor (2004), Global Capital Markets
  • D Puga, ‘Urbanization Patterns: European vs. Less Developed Countries’, Journal of Regional Science (1998) Here
  • A van der Woude, A Hayami & J de Vries (Eds), Urbanisation in History (1990)
  • World Bank, Global Integration and Decentralization in an Urbanizing World (1999)

EH482: Pre-Modern Paths of Growth: East and West Compared, 1000-1800 – Indicative reading


  • M Olson, ‘Big bills left on the sidewalk: why some nations are rich, and others poor’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10:2 (1996) Here
  • E L Jones, Growth Recurring: economic change in world history (1988; 2nd edn, 2002)
  • M Mann, The Sources of Social Power, Vol I (1987)
  • D North & R Thomas, The Rise of the Western World (1973)
  • K G Persson, Pre-industrial Economic Growth (1988); I Wallerstein, Historical Capitalism (1983)
  • P Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (1974)
  • T Aston & C Philpin (Eds), The Brenner Debate: agrarian class structure and economic development in pre-industrial Europe (1985)
  • S R Epstein, Freedom and growth. The rise of states and markets in Europe 1300-1750 (2000)
  • J De Vries, The Economy of Europe in an age of crisis, 1600-1750 (1976)
  • G Deng, The Premodern Chinese Economy (1999)
  • T C Smith, The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan (1959)
  • K Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the making of the modern world economy (2000)
  • A G Frank, ReORIENT: Global economy in the Asian age 1998)

EH481: Economic Change in Global History: Approaches and Analysis – Indicative reading


  • K Pomeranz, The Great Divergence (2000)
  • J Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel (1998)
  • E Jones, Growth Recurring: Economic Change in World History (1988, 2000)
  • D Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (1998)
  • A Frank, Re-Orient: Global economy in the Asian Age (1998)
  • D North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (1990)
  • C Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons (2004)
  • A G Hopkins (ed), Globalization in World History (2002)
  • D Smith, D Solinger & S Topik (eds), States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy (1999)
  • J Osterhammel and N Petersson (eds), Globalization: A Short History (2005)
  • B Gills and W. Thompson (eds), Globalization and Global History (2006)